The Jakarta Post - 'E Pluribus Ika', or the power of diversity in Indonesian society

'E Pluribus Ika', or the power of diversity in Indonesian society

Robert Pringle, Alexandria, Virginia

Many Americans coming to Indonesia, whether for business or pleasure, are nervous about Islam. On the one hand they hear that Indonesia's tropicalized Islam is warm and friendly, not like the harsh desert variety. On the other hand they read about bombings and communal violence in places like Poso, wherever that might be.

The situation is complicated by the fact that most of us lack even stereotypical understanding of Indonesia, of the kind that we have for India and China, for example. Indonesia was never mentioned in our high school world history courses and we are not sure where it begins or end on the map. Do there really have to be so many islands?

A sampling of easily available punditry doesn't help much. We learn that Indonesia is still largely poor and uneducated, that it has been prone to dictatorship and Years of Living Dangerously, tsunamis, volcanoes, earthquakes and too many plane crashes, and that its capital goes completely under water periodically. No wonder all those "tribes" and religions don't get along.

The better informed among us may know that Indonesia's new, blissfully unguided democracy has been doing quite well, and that the current president and his running mate seem to be quite a capable pair, rather more so than the leadership we are experiencing at home.

But we are in a "Yes, But" frame of mind. Tell us that country X is doing well, and we are likely to reply "Yes, But what have they done for us lately?" and then produce a new list of worries: Corruption, unreformed judiciary, environmental disasters, and so on.

And so, regarding Islam in Indonesia, we are not satisfied that the fever chart of regional conflict has trended downwards since it peaked about five years ago, not least due to the major achievement of peace in Aceh. The same goes for the consistent inability of the Islamist parties -- those who would try to replace Indonesia's multicultural model with an Islamic State -- to win more than a small minority in every national election since 1955. (We have no idea of exactly what an Islamic State might be, partly because its advocates don't agree on that issue, but we assume it would mean oppression of women, cutting off thieves' hands, and worse.)

We dismiss the election results with the "Yes, but" notion that since the Islamist parties (with the Prosperous Justice Party or PKS in the lead) can't win openly on Islamist platforms, they must be plotting behind the scenes to "Arabize" Indonesia without daring to say so out loud. Locally they are already at work, taking advantage of Indonesia's decentralized democracy to enact sharia-inspired regulations in somewhere between five to ten percent of all cities and districts.

Fear of creeping "Arabization" tinged with paranoia is shared by quite a few foreigners who know the country relatively well, and also by some Indonesians. It reminds me of the way we Americans used to feel about the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) before it was eliminated in 1966 (granted that given its mass base on Java, the PKI probably had a more numerous following than the Islamists do today). Many foreigners fear that outward signs of religious observance -- the growing use of headscarves, the proliferation of prayer rooms in public places, and so on -- are signs of Wahabi-style fundamentalism, the intellectual underpinning of terrorism.

Think of Indonesian society as a huge tapestry, with many colors and patterns but also with quite a few loose threads. You can grab any one of them and pull, and you may not be sure exactly how much of the thread will break off in your hands, but you know that the entire fabric is not going to unravel.

It is a curious fact that Americans, of all people, have a hard time understanding Indonesian diversity despite our own relevant national experience. Obviously our diversities differ somewhat. Except for newly arrived immigrants, ours is a fairly well liquefied melting pot, whereas Indonesia's is still more gado-gado in consistency. Our national mottos, Bhinekka Tunggal Ika and E Pluribus Unum, mean the same thing.

I am told by John MacDougall, an American anthropologist currently working on a study of Darul Islam, that Bhinekka Tunggal Ika comes from am ancient Indian epic that assumes an inherent tension between "unity" and "diversity."

Indonesians I interviewed emphasize that when Islam arrived, it encountered many highly varied cultures. Numerous blendings of local and imported religious practice were the result. Now people everywhere like to think that their variant "is Islam," I was told.

But they also know that in other regions, people have their own ideas about how Islam should be practiced beyond the five basic pillars of the faith. And they realize, having grown up in gado-gado land, that they cannot impose their religious beliefs on others. More importantly, the vast majority doesn't want to.

Pick any province in Indonesia and you can find rich examples of deeply- rooted diversity, now in full flower under a truly democratic national regime. One of my favorites is West Sumatra, home of one of the few matrilineal Muslim societies in the world. As elsewhere, Islam settled here on a vibrant structure of Hindu and animist tradition.

West Sumatra has produced a astonishingly varied stream of national leaders over the years -- middle-of-the road first Vice President Mohammed Hatta, Islamist politician and prime minister Mohammed Natsir, Communist leader Tan Malaka, and many more. In addition to fostering local pride, this experience has accustomed the Minang people to acute intellectual diversity.

Visit the Padang museum and you will see, among other things, a guide to the gorgeous customary houses with their horned roofs, stylistically similar to bronze-age forms found elsewhere in Indonesia. You will also see a reverent display of the ancient and equally stunning pagoda-style mosques reflecting Hindu heritage.

When I visited Padang in February the city was just recovering from a comical episode which ensued when members of the city legislature tried to ban women from the streets during hours of darkness. The idea was quickly abandoned because Minang women, none of them shrinking violets, run all the markets and need to be at work before dawn.

While West Sumatra's diversity is particularly striking it illustrates themes common to the whole country: The long contest between traditional and modern Islam which, just like a shadow play, no one ever definitively wins; the interplay between ancient and less ancient cultural waves, and strong local identity combined with a sense of nationhood which, however imperfectly, embraces both Bhineka Tunggal Ika.

At the moment decentralized democracy, still very much a work in progress, is encouraging fledgling politicians to stretch their wings and play ethnic politics, sometimes with dangerous as well as amusing results. (We are quite familiar with this syndrome in the U.S.) In the long run, and no doubt after much more tinkering, democracy will give Indonesia's diversity the political breathing space it must have to survive.

The better that foreigners understand the depth and tenacity of Indonesia's diversity, the less they will be inclined to fear that the country is likely to succumb to ideological or religious regimentation.

The writer is a retired diplomat and historian, currently writing a short book on Islam in Indonesia sponsored by the United States -- Indonesia Society. He can be reached at rpringle9@comcast.net.

The Jakarta Post - 'E Pluribus Ika', or the power of diversity in Indonesian society

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Venezuelan bluster? | Economist.com

May 8th 2007
From The Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire

Hugo Chávez threatens to seize banks and a steel-maker

It should come as no surprise that Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chávez, is again threatening private companies with takeover by the state. Emboldened by his landslide December 2006 re-election, he has moved to put additional sectors of the economy under state control. This is line with his goal of implementing his vision of socialism by increasing state authority over key parts of the economy. It is also designed to enhance his own already formidable power.

Just one month after his re-election, Mr Chávez shocked the market by declaring the energy and telecommunications sectors to be “strategic” and therefore subject to nationalisation. Within weeks of the announcement, the government had acquired controlling stakes in both CANTV (Venezuela's largest telecoms company, privatised in the early 1990s) and Electricidad de Caracas (EDC, a private electricity company), buying out US companies in both cases.

Most recently, in early May, he fulfilled a promise to a seize majority equity share and operational control of four heavy-oil joint ventures in the Orinoco oil basin. These were previously controlled by six foreign companies: US-based ConocoPhillips, Chevron and Exxon Mobil, along with the UK’s BP, Norway’s Statoil and France’s Total.

Threats to banks

Facing no significant opposition—indeed opposition political parties remain weak and Mr Chávez’s approval ratings are high—he has now laid his eyes on a foreign-controlled steel maker, Siderúrgica del Orinoco (Sidor), and the banking industry. In the case of Sidor, Mr Chávez has ordered the company to cease exports until it has met the needs of the domestic market, and has threatened to nationalise the company if it resists. Sidor is controlled by the Argentina-based Techint Group.

Mr Chávez has long tried to strong-arm financial institutions in the country, dictating, for example, that a share of their loan portfolios should go to priority sectors such as agriculture, small business and tourism. Now he wants banks to agree to lend to domestic industries at low interest rates. He has warned them that he could take them over, too, if they don’t comply.

It may be difficult for banks to protest or resist, especially since they have registered strong profit growth—up 33% in 2006—thanks to booming domestic credit demand amid fast-paced economic expansion (averaging more than 12% in the last three years). Even short of nationalisation, the government is said to be contemplating other reforms to the sector, which might include a cap on bank profits (with the excess going to social development projects), and further direct control over the setting of interest rates and the allocation of credit.

Free hand

Should the president decide to take such steps against Sidor or the banks, this would be facilitated by special decree powers that the National Assembly granted him in January. For a period of 18 months thereafter, Mr Chávez is empowered to issue decrees in 11 key areas without having to seek legislative approval. In any case, there is little risk that he would not get lawmakers’ authorisation, as the National Assembly is completely controlled by Chávez loyalists (the opposition boycotted the last legislative elections, leaving it with no presence in the body). The decree powers, therefore, serve only to give Mr Chávez the ability to move quicker.

Nationalisation of Sidor or the banks is not likely to be imminent, however. For one, Sidor is controlled by an Argentinian company, and Mr Chávez retains good relations with Argentina’s president, Néstor Kirchner. Moreover, the government already has much to absorb with the takeover of the phone and electricity companies, as well as operational control of the Orinoco oil ventures. It must reimburse the foreign companies for their seized assets as well as take over their debt obligations. The cost of this could be as much as US$10bn for the oil companies alone, according to some estimates.

Money to burn?

With a windfall in oil export income in recent years—oil brought in nearly US$59bn in 2006—and bulging foreign reserves, the Chávez administration has funds to spare. However, when combined with its other spending obligations, especially costly social programmes and subsidies, this will put further pressure on an already widening budget deficit. The deficit was equivalent to 1.8% of GDP in 2006, and the Economist Intelligence Unit projects it will grow to 4.9% of GDP this year. (The true fiscal picture is worse, because some spending is channelled off-budget via the state-owned oil company and the national development fund.) GDP growth itself is slowing—to 5.8% this year and 3.2% in 2008, according to our forecasts.

The radicalisation of policy under Mr Chávez, combined with signs of growing strains on the economy—evidenced not only in the deterioration of public finances and slowing growth but also persistent double-digit inflation, the highest rate in Latin America—are generating more fears among investors. The Caracas stock exchange index has been declining in recent days. Private direct investment has also declining for several years, and this trend is apt to be exacerbated since January. Foreign direct investment was negative last year. The reduction in investment will further lower GDP growth over the medium term.

In addition, the premium paid for the dollar on the black market has been climbing, with the bolívar weakening to around Bs3,950:US$1 (compared with a fixed official rate of Bs2,150:US$1), near to the low point in January of around Bs4,000:US$1. This will increase pressure on the government to devalue the official rate, although it will be reluctant to do so, given an annual inflation rate nearing 20%.

Political risks rise

Despite these negative trends, there are few obstacles to the government’s current policy mix—given its complete control of the legislature and significant influence over weak and politicised institutions. However, the government determination to radicalise its economic programme has the potential to destabilise the political environment, by provoking renewed objections from the opposition political class and also some discontent among more moderate or pragmatic members of the broad pro-Chávez coalition. With no presence in the legislature and little confidence in the impartiality of institutions, the opposition will express its discontent with the direction of economic policy via public demonstrations, keeping the risk of unrest high.

A deteriorating security environment will heighten tensions further, while a lack of checks and balances will raise the risk of heightened corruption and mismanagement, particularly in the context of the current huge expansion in public investment programmes. These risks do not present a challenge to Mr Chávez as yet, but could do so in the medium term. In particular, failure to deliver on issues such as crime, corruption, housing and inflation will eventually erode support for the government.

Venezuelan bluster? | Economist.com

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France Under New Leadership - New York Times

he French (like many Americans) have grown increasingly tired of their cranky and ineffective president, Jacques Chirac. With Nicolas Sarkozy they’ve certainly gotten a very different sort of leader. A graduate of a non-elite university, and the son of a Hungarian immigrant, he won this week’s election promising sweeping change to voters impatient with their country’s long economic and diplomatic decline. But to succeed, Mr. Sarkozy will need to keep his own impatience, and his destructive penchant for divisive rhetoric, under firm control.

Mr. Sarkozy hopes to strengthen ties with Washington while pursuing a more active role in Europe. A France that is neither reflexively anti-American nor in automatic lock step with Washington would be good for both sides of the Atlantic. To start, more active Franco-American military cooperation in Afghanistan and diplomatic coordination on Sudan could make a big difference.

Then there is the vexed issue of agricultural protection, and the vexing clout of French farmers. Mr. Sarkozy and Mr. Bush are both avowed free-traders. A joint push to lower agricultural barriers could revive international trade talks and give African countries, including those with close ties to Paris, a fairer chance at development.

For most voters, the compelling issues were domestic, especially the challenge of invigorating an economy weighed down by decades of slow growth, high unemployment and suburban decay. Mr. Sarkozy’s call for tax cuts, smaller government, longer working hours and tougher labor policies won out over his Socialist rival’s contention that she could administer the needed economic jolts while preserving the security and comfort of the social status quo.

Mr. Sarkozy’s ability to carry out those changes will depend on how well his right-wing allies fare in next month’s parliamentary election and his ability to rally a wider political coalition for what will be painful and dislocating changes. Mr. Sarkozy will especially have to overcome the distrust of young urban immigrants, whom he has demeaned with insulting stereotypes and frightened with simplistic law-and-order prescriptions.

If Mr. Sarkozy means what he now says about being “president of all the French,” he needs to recognize that there are many equally legitimate ways of being French. And that the problems of poverty and unemployment require much broader solutions than simple law and order.

France Under New Leadership - New York Times

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Tackling climate change | A bargain | Economist.com

What it would cost to tackle climate change—about 0.1% of world GDP, a year

AFP

Get article background

THE Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), set up under the auspices of the United Nations to establish a consensus on global warming and what to do about it, has now completed its fourth assessment report. The first two parts, published earlier this year, about the science and the impacts of climate change, were designed to spread gloom. Change was happening, they said; it was mankind’s fault; and it was going to be damaging. The third part, released on Friday May 4th in Bangkok, is about mitigating climate change, and is designed to spread hope. Just as mankind caused the problem, it says, so mankind can stop it—and at a reasonable cost.

In some areas of economic activity, emissions could be cut with no cost to consumers or taxpayers. The heating and lighting systems of many buildings, for instance, are startlingly inefficient. Improving this would cut both emissions and bills. Economists are troubled by this, for it implies that people and businesses are not maximising their economic self-interest; yet the low take-up of energy-efficient lightbulbs suggests this is indeed the case. Governments are therefore beginning to tighten regulations on the energy efficiency of buildings, and to talk about, for instance, banning incandescent lightbulbs. The IPCC reckons that such measures could cut 30% of projected emissions from this sector at no extra cost.

Transport is trickier, because car ownership is rocketing and the demand for fuel is fairly inelastic. If people want to drive they are going to drive, unless governments jack up petrol prices to levels that are politically unacceptable. So for emissions to fall in the transport sector, new technologies, such as more efficient biofuels or electric cars, are needed. Given a big R&D effort in this sector, there is a good chance that those will be forthcoming.

Similarly, in power generation, there is scope for cutting emissions. The cost of renewable energy, such as wind and solar, has been falling. Nuclear generating technology has improved. Carbon capture and storage, which involves taking the carbon dioxide (or C02) out of power station flue gases and injecting it back into the earth, is also a possibility, though that technology is at an early stage.

Technological solutions to climate change, then, are available. But most of those on offer in the power and transport sectors cost more than fossil-fuel generated energy. Fortunately, economics comes to the rescue. Burning fossil fuels imposes a cost to society that is not reflected in their price. Economics says that it should be; and if it were, the price of using fossil fuels would rise in relation to the price of using renewable energy.

Unfortunately, the social cost of carbon is hard to calculate. Plenty of economists have tried, with unconvincing results. It requires estimating the impact of climate change on economic growth, which involves too many unknowns. So the IPCC report starts from the other end. Rather than trying to work out the social cost of carbon, and letting it feed through to reduce greenhouse-gas concentrations in the atmosphere, it starts from a manageable greenhouse-gas concentration and works backwards to a carbon price. Conveniently, it says the “social cost of carbon is at least comparable to, and possibly higher than carbon prices for even the most stringent scenarios assessed by the IPCC”.

And what is the right price? The report says that to stabilise greenhouse-gas concentrations at 550 parts per million (a level most scientists think safeish) would require a price of $20-50 per tonne of carbon by 2020-30. That is along the lines of the carbon price established the European Emissions-Trading Scheme, which varied between $6 and $40 in 2005-06. It has not bankrupted the European economy so far. The IPCC’s economic models reckon, on average, that if the world adopted such a price the global economy would be 1.3% smaller than it otherwise would have been by 2050; or, put another way, global economic growth would be 0.1% a year lower than it otherwise would have been.

The world would barely notice such figures; so one might think that climate change can be easily sorted. The problem, of course, is that the numbers work only if they are applied globally. If a few countries—even a few big countries—adopt a carbon price, it will make little difference. All the world’s big emitters need to do it. Which brings the world straight back to the problem that sank Kyoto. No country alone can make a difference, and it is in every country’s interest to ensure that everybody else bears the burden. As the IPCC report convincingly argues, the technology and the economics of this problem are easily soluble. It is the politics that is so difficult.

Tackling climate change | A bargain | Economist.com

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