Basic Cell Phone Acronyms You Need to Know : Ben Patterson : Yahoo! Tech

Confused by the alphabet soup of cell phone acronyms? I don't blame you. Here's a cheat sheet that'll help you navigate the waters while your shopping for your next phone—or trying to get the most out of the handset you've got.

Most of the confusion arises when it comes to the various types of cell phone networks. For example, when I ask my aunts and uncles which networks their phones work on, they'll usually tell me their carrier instead of whether they're using GSM or CDMA—and frankly, before I started writing about cell phones for a living, I didn't know the difference, either. So first, let's start with a quick overview of the two main standard for cell networks:


Confused by the alphabet soup of cell phone acronyms? I don't blame you. Here's a cheat sheet that'll help you navigate the waters while your shopping for your next phone—or trying to get the most out of the handset you've got.

Most of the confusion arises when it comes to the various types of cell phone networks. For example, when I ask my aunts and uncles which networks their phones work on, they'll usually tell me their carrier instead of whether they're using GSM or CDMA—and frankly, before I started writing about cell phones for a living, I didn't know the difference, either. So first, let's start with a quick overview of the two main standard for cell networks:

GSM: Short for Global System for Mobile Communications, GSM is the most widespread standard for cell phones networks in the world. If you're a jetsetter who likes keeping in touch during your far-flung travels, you should go with a GSM-enabled phone, and here in the U.S., AT&T and T-Mobile are both GSM carriers. Besides the technical differences between CDMA and GSM networks (I'll spare you the details), the main distinction of a GSM phone is that it comes with a SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card—a little plastic chip that, as its name implies, identifies your phone on the GSM network. If you take the SIM card out of your GSM phone and put it into another GSM handset, you'll be able to place and receive calls on the second phone using your own cell phone number. GSM phones are also capable of handling six-way conference calls.
CDMA: Short for Code Division Multiple Access, CDMA networks are much more prevalent in the U.S. than they are abroad, and while CDMA boasts many of the same features as GSM networks (including caller ID, call waiting, and text messaging), there are some key differences—namely, CDMA phones don't use SIM cards. Instead, your phone's identity and number are programmed into the handset by your carrier, and you can't easily switch numbers on CDMA phones as you can with SIM-equipped GSM phones. Also, CDMA phones can only handle three-way conference calls, versus six-way calls on GSM networks. Major CDMA carriers in the U.S. include Sprint, Verizon Wireless, and regional operator Alltel.

OK, so you've got your two main flavors of networks, but now I'm going to stir another variable into the mix: 3G. Here's the deal: GSM and CDMA are both considered second-generation, or 2G, networks (the first generation being AMPS, an analog network used mainly back in the 1980s). Unlike the old voice-only AMPS networks, digital GSM and CDMA networks can handle both voice and data calls, which means you can send text messages, surf the Web and get caller ID info. But data flows slowly over GSM and CDMA—think dial-up, only slower. Streaming video and music? Forget it.

That's where 3G, or third-generation networks, come in. These so-called 3G systems allow data to flow at speeds you'd expect from a home DSL modem or better—and at those speeds, you get features like streaming video and full-track music downloads. The main types of 3G networks include:


EV-DO: An add-on for CDMA networks, EV-DO (or Evolution-Data Optimized) delivers data speeds between 144Kbps to 2Mbps to CDMA cell phones, perfect for streaming video and music. Sprint offers EV-DO access through its Power Vision phones (which are typically a little pricier than standard models); on Verizon Wireless, look for the "V Cast" label.
UMTS and HSDPA: Both UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) and HSDPA (High-Speed Downlink Packet Access) are upgrades to GSM networks, and like EV-DO, they provide DSL and cable-like data speed. The only difference between UMTS and HSDPA (besides the technical nitty-gritty, of course) is that HSDPA is even faster than UMTS; for that reason, HSDPA networks are often called 3.5G rather than just 3G. In the U.S., only AT&T offers UMTS and HSDPA networks. (T-Mobile is busy working on its own HSDPA network, which should begin going online by the end of the year.)

Somewhere between 3G and 2G lies, naturally enough, 2.5G networks, which give you data speeds that are slightly faster than dial-up—no good for streaming video, but fine for messaging or mobile Web browsing. These networks include:


1xRTT: A variant of the CDMA standard, 1xRTT (or "1 times Radio Transmission Technology") gives you data speeds between 30Kbps and 90Kbps, a bit better than your typical 56Kbps dial-up modem. Most of the non-3G phones on Sprint and Verizon have 1xRTT capabilities.
GPRS and EDGE: The 2.5G flavors of GSM networks, GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) and EDGE (Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution) also give you data in the 30Kbps to 90Kbps range, with EDGE running slightly faster than GPRS. Again, most of the non-3G phones on AT&T offer either GPRS or EDGE, while T-Mobile—which has yet to launch a 3G network—only does GPRS and EDGE.

Whew! That's a lot of terminology, I know—and believe it or not, I've barely scratched the surface. I'll tackle more wireless acronyms in future posts; in the meantime, if you're curious about the technical details of the various cell networks, I'd suggest combing through Wikipedia, or check out Phonescoop's exhaustive glossary.


Basic Cell Phone Acronyms You Need to Know : Ben Patterson : Yahoo! Tech

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Iran’s Centrifuges - New York Times

For a U.N.-baiting, diplomacy-bashing crowd, the Bush administration has shown unexpected patience in trying to persuade the Security Council to punish Iran for its nuclear misbehavior. And for a foot-dragging, conflict-averse crowd, the Security Council has moved with alacrity in imposing two sets of sanctions on Iran just since December.

Unfortunately, Iran is still playing to type.



Iran’s Centrifuges
For a U.N.-baiting, diplomacy-bashing crowd, the Bush administration has shown unexpected patience in trying to persuade the Security Council to punish Iran for its nuclear misbehavior. And for a foot-dragging, conflict-averse crowd, the Security Council has moved with alacrity in imposing two sets of sanctions on Iran just since December.

Unfortunately, Iran is still playing to type.

Nine months after the Council ordered Tehran to suspend enriching uranium, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency say Iran’s scientists are close to mastering the process that would allow them to produce fuel for a nuclear weapon.

Some diplomats have begun arguing that now that the “point of no return” has passed, the Security Council should drop its insistence that Iran halt all enrichment — and the sanctions attached to that demand — and focus on trying to contain the size of the enrichment program and ensuring that inspectors can monitor the effort. That may well be where this will all end up. But it is far too soon to make that sort of concession, especially since Iran has a proven record of pocketing concessions and pushing its program ahead.

Given the urgency and ambition of Iran’s nuclear program, what is needed is a more urgent and ambitious international response. Let us be clear, this is not a call for more White House saber rattling and certainly not for military planning. There is no military solution. But unless Iran’s leaders are offered far more attractive rewards — yes, we’re talking about a grand bargain — and threatened with far more painful punishments — yes, that could mean another spike in world oil prices — there is no chance of changing their behavior.

That means that President Bush is going to have to put a lot more on the table, including a clear offer of full diplomatic relations and security guarantees should Iran agree to verifiably contain its nuclear ambitions. And it also means that the Europeans, Russians and Chinese are going to have to take a lot more off the table, cutting back diplomatic and trade relations if Tehran continues to push its nuclear program ahead.

It is hard to decide which is making Tehran more cocky these days: its scientists’ technical successes or America’s disastrous failure in Iraq. But its recent talk of rationing gasoline — now delayed — shows a clear and present vulnerability.

Until now, both Mr. Bush and his diplomatic partners have managed to sidestep any really tough choices when it comes to Iran’s nuclear program. The lesson of the new I.A.E.A. report is that the time for sidestepping has run out. What is needed is a frank and public discussion about the cost of Iran getting a nuclear weapon and what the world is willing to give and take away to try to prevent that.

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Blogger Help : How can I create expandable post summaries?

Blogger Help : How can I create expandable post summaries?

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Striking a new realism - International Herald Tribune

WASHINGTON:
Neither the Democratic takeover of Congress nor the beginning of the presidential campaign has yet started a meaningful foreign policy debate in the United States. In fact, setting aside Iraq, neither presidential candidates, Congress, nor the media have shown much interest in a serious conversation about the direction of U.S. foreign policy. And a majority of legislators and opinion leaders act as if Iraq were an isolated mistake resulting from the peculiar incompetence of the Bush administration rather than a logical consequence of the country's flawed post-Cold War foreign policy approach.
The problem is not new. When the United States became the only superpower, quite a few in the foreign policy elite could not withstand the temptation of triumphalism and a sense of unlimited possibilities. Near unanimity emerged between liberal interventionist Democrats and neoconservative Republicans, who together were able to dominate discourse on world affairs.
The American media's propensity to cover international relations through the prism of domestic politics helped to create the false sense of "Washington consensus." Those who have roles in previous administrations, connections to the current one, or a good chance to join the next one, enjoy the best access to op-ed pages and television.
The trouble is that while many of these people have impeccable academic credentials, few are analysts first and foremost. Many are members of a government-in-exile aspiring to return to power or work in businesses that depend on political connections. Such individuals naturally and understandably tend to be very careful to avoid defying the conventional wisdom; they are especially careful to avoid saying anything that could make them vulnerable to criticism.
Thus, in 2007, America has not yet had a serious debate about its role in the world in the 21st century. This is quite a contrast to the vigorous discussion of America's global mission at the end of World War II, which included lively exchanges on confronting the Soviet challenge, rebuilding Europe, moving Japan away from militarism, and creating a new structure of international organizations and regional alliances.
Today, beyond acknowledging that the United States is the only superpower with a unique mission and responsibilities, there is little assessment of the profound difference between America trying to play a global hegemon pressing mankind to take the direction it wants and, conversely, acting as a leader who genuinely strives to develop consensus positions reflecting not only its priorities, but also the interests and preferences of others.
While the choice is clearly not black and white, there is a choice. But do not expect to see much outside foreign policy journals.
Considerable evidence, for example, suggests that more even-handed U.S. management of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is essential to marginalize Islamic extremists. Yet presidential candidates are reluctant to offend Israel's supporters, and most members of Congress - from both parties - are running away from this explosive issue.
The conversation on Iran also has not gone beyond clichés like "no option should be off the table" and "dialogue might be a good idea." Most politicians, with the notable exceptions of Senators Dianne Feinstein, Democrat of California, and Chuck Hagel, Republican of Nebraska, fail even to acknowledge that the U.S. policy of regime change gives Tehran less incentive to accommodate American preferences.
There is also little public dialogue on the rise of China. On this the Bush administration is more pragmatic than many Democrats in Congress, who engage in populist, protectionist posturing. But no American leader is asking how the U.S. insistence on overwhelming military predominance - as important as it is - will affect China's views of its security requirements.
Finally, while there is bipartisan frustration with Russia's undemocratic trends at home and growing assertiveness abroad, most see a need to obtain its cooperation on matters like nuclear nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and support of Western positions in the UN Security Council. But many in the American political class still find it offensive to suggest that Washington may occasionally have to accommodate the Kremlin to secure this help.
For almost 20 years, it has been fashionable in the United States to assume that America could guide the world toward market democracy, that this would advance U.S. interests and the wishes of mankind alike, and that it would be cheap. A whole generation of politicians, opinion-makers and specialists has been brought up to believe that foreign policy realism is unnecessary and even immoral.
But this self-serving naïveté increasingly clashes with the pragmatic requirements of protecting U.S. security and enhancing American influence. Behind the facade of artificial consensus, more and more people in both parties are raising questions about the direction of U.S. foreign policy. The question is whether their voices will become sufficiently loud and powerful before a new international crisis strikes.
Dimitri K. Simes, the president of The Nixon Center, is publisher of The National Interest. This article was adapted from an essay that appeared in that publication.
Striking a new realism - International Herald Tribune

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